136-137. Most uncertainty has long centered on the alleged second attack of August 4. Historians still disagree over whether Johnson deliberately misled Congress and the American people about the Tonkin Gulf incident or simply capitalized on an opportunity that came his way. Both orders were repeated, but only the latter was relayed to the torpedo boats before the attack was launched. We're going to retaliate and well make an announcement a little later in the evening, in the next hour or so and well ask Congress for a resolution of war the next day to support us, Johnson toldan old friend. (Hanoi remains muzzy on the second incident, Aug. 4, presumably since clearly it took place in international waters, the Vietnamese claim of "defensive reaction" is a bit wobbly.). Within the year, U.S. bombers would strike North Vietnam, and U.S. ground units would land on South Vietnamese soil. The after-action reports from the participants in the Gulf arrived in Washington several hours after the report of the second incident. And it didnt take much detective work to figure out where the commandos were stationed. 17. IV-2 to IV-4. By then, early news accounts had already solidified some opinions, and the Johnson Administration had decided to launch retaliatory strikes. . WebThe Gulf of Tonkin While Kennedy had at least the comforting illusion of progress in Vietnam (manufactured by Harkins and Diem), Johnson faced a starker picture of confusion, disunity, and muddle in Saigon and of a rapidly growing Viet Cong in the countryside. They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam. But, to me, the more pernicious deception was this idea that American ships were sailing innocently in the Gulf of Tonkin and were attacked without provocation, he continues. After several early failures, it was transferred to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group in 1964, at which time its focus shifted to maritime operations. HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 25,000 articles originally published in our nine magazines. Around midday on Aug. 4, Adm. Grant Sharp, the top navy commander in the Pacific, made a call to the Joint Chiefs, and it was clear there were significant doubts about this second incident. 4. The most popular of these is that the incident was either a fabrication or deliberate American provocation. 15. Thus, this is an "official" history, not an official one because "the authors do not necessarily speak for the Department of Navy nor attempt to present a consensus." Neither the United States nor State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. Alerted to the threat, Herrick requested air support from the carrier USS Ticonderoga. "4 On Tuesday morning, Aug. 4, 1964, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara called President Lyndon Johnson with a report about a possible confrontation brewing in southeast Asia. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 2. For the maritime part of the covert operation, Nasty-class fast patrol boats were purchased quietly from Norway to lend the illusion that the United States was not involved in the operations. Thousands of passengers are stranded after Colombias Viva Air grounds flights, The last of Mexicos artisanal salt-makers preserve a 2,000-year-old tradition, I cannot give up: Cambodian rapper says he will sing about injustice despite threats from govt, Ukrainian rock star reflects on a year of war in his country, Ukrainian refugees in Poland will now be charged to stay in state-funded housing, This Colombian town is dimming its lights to attract more tourists to view the night sky, Kneel and apologize!: 76 years after island-wide massacre, Taiwan continues to commemorate and debate the tragedy. To the northwest, though they could not see it in the blackness, was Hon Me; to the southwest lay Hon Nieu. In addition, the US Navy was instructed to conduct Desoto patrols off North Vietnam. At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. Two hours later, Captain Herrick reported the sinking of two enemy patrol boats. LBJ's War is a new, limited-edition podcast that unearths previously unheard audio that helps us better understand the course of the Vietnam War and how Lyndon Johnson found himself where he did. While I was in training, my motivation was to get these wings and I wear them today proudly, the airman recalled in 2015. McNamara insisted that the evidence clearly indicated there was an attack on August 4, and he continued to maintain so in his book In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons From Vietnam. He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, Americas Last Vietnam Battle (Hippocrene Books, 1994), and Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Lexington Books, 1990). That night and morning, while cruising in heavy weather, the ships received radar, radio, and sonar reports that signaled another North Vietnamese attack. It also outlined the Maddoxs path along the coast on 2 August and the 34A attacks on Vinh Son the following day. One 12.7mm machine bullet hit Maddox before the boats broke off and started to withdraw. Nonetheless, the North Vietnamese boats continued to close in at the rate of 400 yards per minute. Fluoride.
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution | History, Facts, & Significance Both countries were backing North Vietnam, but so far they were staying out of the conflict and the White House wanted to keep it that way. Today, it is believed that this second attack did not occur and was merely reports from jittery radar and sonar operators, but at the time it was taken as evidence that Hanoi was raising the stakes against the United States. The North Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made all this clear in September when it published a "Memorandum Regarding the U.S. War Acts Against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the First Days of August 1964." WebNational Security Agency/Central Security Service > Home Within days, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the provisions of the Geneva Accords. 426-436. In August 1964, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf resolutionor Southeast Asia Resolution, as it is officially knownthe congressional decree that gave President Lyndon Johnson a broad mandate to wage war in Vietnam. Speculation about administration motives surrounding the Tonkin Gulf incident itself and the subsequent withholding of key information will probably never cease, but the factual intelligence record that drove those decisions is now clear. "13 As far as the State Department was concerned, there was no need to "review" the operations. Until 1964, Desoto patrols stayed at least 20 miles away from the coast. Hanoi pointed out what Washington denied: "On July 30, 1964 . Media Manipulation.
How the Gulf of Tonkin Incident Embroiled the US in the Vietnam This was reinforced by statements by retired Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap who admitted to the Aug. 2 attack but denied ordering another two days later. Just after midnight on 4 August, PTF-6 turned for home, pursued by an enemy Swatow. The historian here is obliged to deal with two basic considerations in offering up an accounting: the event itself -- that is, what actually happened there in the waters off North Vietnam in early August 1964; and the uses made of it by President Lyndon Johnson and his administration. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." Moments later, one of the crewmen spotted a North Vietnamese Swatow patrol boat bearing down on them. "I think we are kidding the world if you try to give the impression that when the South Vietnamese naval boats bombarded two islands a short distance off the coast of North Vietnam we were not implicated," he scornfully told McNamara during the hearings.16 9/11. McNamara did not mention the 34A raids.15. The threat removed, Maddox retired from the area to rejoin friendly forces. Lyndon Johnson on August 5, 1964, assertedly in reaction to two Seventh Fleet reduced it to 12 nautical miles.
The Science of Conspiracy Theories - Gulf of Tonkin conspiracy Hanoi was more than willing to tell the world about the attacks, and it took either a fool or an innocent to believe that the United States knew nothing about the raids. As such, its personnel in Vietnam were the envy of their Army counterparts in the bush since, as it was commonly put, sailors sleep between clean sheets at night (the grunts were also envious of the Air Force, where you fight sitting down). But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. Naval Institute Proceedings (February 1992), p. 59. But by the end of June, the situation had changed. Because the North Vietnamese had fewer than 50 Swatows, most of them up north near the important industrial port of Haiphong, the movement south of one-third of its fleet was strong evidence that 34A and the Desoto patrols were concerning Hanoi. For some reason, however, the second Desoto Mission, to be conducted by Maddox, was not canceled, even though it was scheduled to start at the same time that a late July commando mission was being launched. Declassified NSA documents show that US intelligence members concealed relevant reports from Congress to push the narrative of a second attack. CIA Director John McCone was convinced that Hanoi was reacting to the raids when it attacked the Maddox. Three days later, she rendezvoused with a tanker just east of the DMZ before beginning her intelligence- gathering mission up the North Vietnamese coast. The Gulf of Tonkin incident: the false flag operation that started the Vietnam war. Something Isnt Working Refresh the page to try again. Something Isnt Working 10. It was 1964, an election year, and the Republicans had just nominated Barry Goldwater, a former jet fighter pilot, and hardcore hawk, to run against Johnson in November. A brief account of the raids is in MACVSOG 1964 Command History, Annex A, 14 January 1965, pp. President Johnson and his advisers nevetheless went forward with a public announcement of an attack. In less than 25 minutes, the attack was over. Everything went smoothly until the early hours of 2 August, when intelligence picked up indications that the North Vietnamese Navy had moved additional Swatows into the vicinity of Hon Me and Hon Nieu Islands and ordered them to prepare for battle. "14, Nasty fast patrol boats demonstrated their versatility in the Pacific Ocean before going to Vietnam.U.S. Any escalation in the bombing of the North risked provoking the Russians or, more likely, the Chinese. That night, on national television, Johnson addressedthe American people, saying,Renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to take action and reply. McNamara and the JCS believed that this intercept decisively provided the smoking gun of the second attack, and so the president reported to the American people and Congress. Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the NSC, 4 August 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m., Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, vol. While there was some doubt in Washington regarding the second attack, those aboard Maddox and Turner Joy were convinced that it had occurred. 10. Badly damaged, the boat limped home. So, whether by accident or design, American actions in the Tonkin Gulf triggered a response from the North Vietnamese, not the other way around.
Conspiracy FACT #8: The Gulf of Tonkin Incident - YouTube "The North Vietnamese are reacting defensively to our attacks on their offshore islands. "We believe that present OPLAN 34A activities are beginning to rattle Hanoi," wrote Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "and [the] Maddox incident is directly related to their effort to resist these activities. PTF-2 had mechanical troubles and had to turn back, but the other boats made it to their rendezvous point off the coast from Vinh Son. Ogier then opened fire at 1508 hours, when the boats were only six minutes from torpedo range. Ticonderoga ordered four A-1H Skyraiders into the air to support the ships. I would not suggest that he learned from the Gulf of Tonkin incident so much as that he got from it exactly what he wanted, which was an enormous bump in approval ratings 30 percent overnight, says historian Chris Oppe. 1, Vietnam 1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 611. Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia. . This is not the place to establish the final truth on the Gulf of Tonkin matter and certainly I am not the person to render the ultimate judgment. Americas Vietnam War had begun in earnest. "11 Surprised by the North Vietnamese response, Johnson decided that the United States could not back away from the challenge and directed his commanders in the Pacific to continue with the Desoto missions. Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration One element of American assistance to South Vietnam included covert support for South Vietnamese commando raids against North Vietnams coastal transportation facilities and networks. The three torpedo boats continued through the American barrage and launched their torpedoes at 1516. Senator Morse was one of the dissenters. Returning fire, Maddox scored hits on the P-4s while being struck by a single 14.5-millimeter machine gun bullet. . In the years covered here, the Navy was generally known throughout the U.S. Mission in Saigon for being in the housekeeping business, operating supply warehouses, and running the officer clubs, PXs and other amenities, an inevitable part of the American military's baggage. While many facts and details have emerged in the past 44 years to persuade most observers that some of the reported events in the Gulf never actually happened, key portions of the critical intelligence information remained classified until recently. Launching on Aug. 5, Operation Pierce Arrow saw aircraft from USS Ticonderoga and USS Constellation strike oil facilities at Vinh and attack approximately 30 North Vietnamese vessels. That initial error shaped all the subsequent assessments about North Vietnamese intentions, as U.S. SIGINT monitored and reported the Norths tracking of the two American destroyers. Subscribe to LBJ's War onApple Podcasts. The most comprehensive and authoritative history site on the Internet. At 2000 hours local time, Maddox reported it had two surface and three aerial contacts on radar. It was 20 minutes into the new day, 31 July, when PTF-3 and PTF-6, both under the command of Lieutenant Sonconsidered one of the best boat skippers in the covert fleetreached Hon Me and began their run at the shore. The Health Conspiracy. .
The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History Holding their vector despite the gunfire, the boats rushed in, pouring 20-mm and 40-mm fire and 57-mm recoilless rifle rounds into their target. NSA analysts from shore-based stations shared Herricks belief and transmitted an immediate warning to all major Pacific Theater commandsexcept to Herrick and Maddox. As the enemy boat passed astern, it was raked by gunfire from the Maddox that killed the boats commander. The only solution was to get rid of the evidence. 5. The North also protested the South Vietnamese commando raid on Hon Me Island and claimed that the Desoto Mission ships had been involved in that raid. We still seek no wider war.. What did and didnt happen in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2 and 4 has long been in dispute, but the decisions that the Johnson Administration and Congress made based on an interpretation of those events were undeniably monumental. Nigerians await election results in competitive race. Whats not in dispute is the aftermath: A resolution from the Senate Forced Government Indoctrination Camps . The history stops with the U.S. Navy moving into full combat duty -- the naval and air interdictions in South and North Vietnam -- the subject of future volumes. The publicity caused by the Tonkin Gulf incident and the subsequent resolution shifted attention away from covert activities and ended high-level debate over the wisdom of secret operations against North Vietnam. Covert maritime operations were in full swing, and some of the missions succeeded in blowing up small installations along the coast, leading General Westmoreland to conclude that any close connection between 34A and Desoto would destroy the thin veneer of deniability surrounding the operations. WebCongress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution before the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. He reported those doubts in his after action report transmitted shortly after midnight his time on August 5, which was 1300 hours August 4 in Washington. President, weve just had a report from the commander of that task force out there The report is that they have observed and we don't know by what means two unidentified vessels and three unidentified prop aircraft in the vicinity of the destroyers, McNamara told the president. It set a very terrible precedent, which is that he would go on to escalate further, not with any striking confidence that his objectives will be achieved, but only with the assurance that, unless he embarked on these massive military escalations, America would fail in Vietnam and he might well be labeled the only president in American history to lose a war.. As a result, the ships offshore were able to collect valuable information on North Vietnamese military capabilities. The battle was over in 22 minutes. 8. 3. The North Vietnamese didnt buy the distinction; they attacked the USS Maddox. The North Vietnamese did not react, probably because no South Vietnamese commando operations were underway at that time. The series of mistakes that led to the August 4 misreporting began on August 3 when the Phu Bai station interpreted Haiphongs efforts to determine the status of its forces as an order to assemble for further offensive operations. Forty-five minutes after beginning their attack, the commandos withdrew. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. These types of patrols had previously been conducted off the coasts of the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea. In the meantime, aboard Turner Joy, Captain Herrick ordered an immediate review of the nights actions. In July 1964, Operational Plan 34A was taking off, but during the first six months of this highly classified program of covert attacks against North Vietnam, one after the other, missions failed, often spelling doom for the commando teams inserted into the North by boat and parachute.
The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 They issued a recall order from Haiphong to the port commander and communications relay boat two hours after the torpedo boat squadron command issued its attack order. This is another government conspiracy that's true. For additional reading, see the recently declassified NSA study by Robert J. Hanyok, Spartans in the Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975; and Tonkin Gulf and The Escalation of the Vietnam War, by Edward Moise. SOG took the mounting war of words very seriously and assumed the worstthat an investigation would expose its operations against the North. AND THERE is the fact of Vietnam's position today. Mr. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, like others in our nation's history, has become the center of considerable controversy and debate. These warning shots were fired and the P-4s launched a torpedo attack. This was the only time covert operations against the North came close to being discussed in public. Shortly thereafter, the Phu Bai station intercepted the signal indicating the North Vietnamese intended to conduct a torpedo attack against the enemy. Phu Bai issued a Critic Reportshort for critical message, meaning one that had priority over all other traffic in the communications system to ensure immediate deliveryto all commands, including Maddox. After the Tonkin Gulf incident, the State Department cabled Seaborn, instructing him to tell the North Vietnamese that "neither the Maddox or any other destroyer was in any way associated with any attack on the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or North Vietnam] islands." After a suspected torpedo attack by North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats led to plans for US retaliation,the captain of the Maddox sent a cable to the Joint Chiefs that advised "complete evaluation before any further action"due to grave doubts over whether an attackhad reallyoccurred. Carl Otis Schuster, U.S. Navy (ret.) Maddox detected the torpedo boats on radar at a range of almost 20,000 yards and turned away at its top speed of 32 knots. In July, General Westmoreland asked that Desoto patrols be expanded to cover 34A missions from Vinh Son north to the islands of Hon Me, Hon Nieu, and Hon Mat, all of which housed North Vietnamese radar installations or other coastwatching equipment. Background intelligence on North Vietnam, its radar networks and command-and-control systems was limited. Cookies collect information about your preferences and your devices and are used to make the site work as you expect it to, to understand how you interact with the site, and to show advertisements that are targeted to your interests. Oklahoma City Bombing. Under the operational control of Captain John J. Herrick, it steamed through the Gulf of Tonkin collecting intelligence. For 25 minutes the boats fired on the radar station, then headed back to Da Nang. Herrick requested aerial reconnaissance for the next morning to search for the wreckage of the torpedo boats he thought he had sunk. In 2005 documents were released proving that Johnson had fabricated the Gulf of Tonkin incident in order to justify attacking North Vietnam. In a conversation with McNamara on Aug. 3, after the first incident, Johnson indicated he hadalready thought about the political ramifications of a military response and hadconsulted with several allies. The North Vietnamese coastal radars also tracked and reported the positions of U.S. aircraft operating east of the ships, probably the combat air patrol the Seventh Fleet had ordered in support. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident and many more recent experiences only reinforce the need for intelligence analysts and decision makers to avoid relying exclusively on any single intelligence sourceeven SIGINTparticularly if other intelligence sources are available and the resulting decisions might cost lives. The Geneva Conference in 1954 was intended to settle outstanding issues following the end of hostilities between France and the Viet Minh at the end of the First Indochina War. It is not NSA's intention to prove or Carl Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer with 10 years of experience as a surface line officer. In the future, conventional operations would receive all the attention. Gulf of Tonkin & the Vietnam War. We have ample forces to respond not only to these attacks on these destroyers but also to retaliate, should you wish to do so, against targets on the land, he toldthe president. At this point, U.S. involvement in Vietnam remained largely in the background. 8. After 15 minutes of maneuvering, the F-8s arrived and strafed the North Vietnamese boats, damaging two and leaving the third dead in the water. Subsequent research and declassified documents have essentially shown that the second attack did not happen. He readthe chiefs a cable from the captain of the Maddox. The boats followed at their maximum speed of 44 knots, continuing the chase for more than 20 minutes. Interpretation by historians as to what exactly did and did not occur during those few days in early August 1964 remains so varied that the wonder is that authors Marolda and Fitzgerald were able themselves to settle on the text. Thats what all the country wants, because Goldwater's raising so much hell about how he's gonna blow 'em off the moon, and they say that we oughtn't to do anything that the national interest doesn't require. WebThe Senate passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution with only two opposing votes, and the House of Representatives passed it unanimously. On the night of 4 August, both ships reported renewed attacks by North Vietnamese patrol boats.
Then, everyones doubts were swept away when a SIGINT intercept from one of the North Vietnamese torpedo boats reported the claim that it had shot down two American planes in the battle area. History is a guide to navigation in perilous times. U.S. SIGINT support had provided ample warning of North Vietnams intentions and actions, enabling the American ship to defend itself successfully. The 122 additional relevant SIGINT products confirmed that the Phu Bai station had misinterpreted or mistranslated many of the early August 3 SIGINT intercepts. The disclaimer is required, if for no other reason than because of Chapter 15, "The American Response to the Gulf of Tonkin Attacks," about which more later. McNamara took advantage of Morses imprecision and concentrated on the senators connection between 34A and Desoto, squirming away from the issue of U.S. involvement in covert missions by claiming that the Maddox "was not informed of, was not aware [of], had no evidence of, and so far as I know today had no knowledge of any possible South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands Senator Morse referred to." What will be of interest to the general reader is the treatment of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. People are human and make mistakes, particularly in the pressure of a crisis or physical threat to those they support. When you visit the site, Dotdash Meredith and its partners may store or retrieve information on your browser, mostly in the form of cookies. The United States Military had three SIGINT stations in the Philippines, one for each of the services, but their combined coverage was less than half of all potential North Vietnamese communications. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident | Naval History You can find out more about our use, change your default settings, and withdraw your consent at any time with effect for the future by visiting Cookies Settings, which can also be found in the footer of the site.